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Respect for the Law Is No Excuse:
Drug Addiction History & Public Safety Officer
Qualifications ... Are Public Employers Breaking
the Law?
MATTHEW AmIossi
Employers ofpublic safety officers are justifiably concerned with both the
character of individuals they hire and the public's perception of law
enforcement agencies. To address these concerns, many state and local
regulations require (or permi a public employer to disqualify an applicant if he
or she has a history of drug addiction. Few disqualified applicants have
challenged the legality of these "no drug history" qualifications. In an effort to
encourage such challenges, this Note explores the possible statutory and
constitutional theories on which a rehabilitated applicant can rely to gain access
to public safety officer positions. Challenges to the current blanket exclusion
standards are necessary in light of both the language and policy of the disability
discrimination statutes, which mandate that individualized determinations take
the place ofgeneralizations and stereotypes.
The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, and lower courts have
reached inconsistent conclusions on analogous facts. Because of the strength of
arguments that a rehabilitated individual could make as well as changing
societal attitudes about one's private life, this Note contends that public
employers should discontinue using drug addiction history as a per se
disqualificationforpublic safety officers in order to safeguard against inevitable
liability.
"Man is a history-making creature, who can neither repeat his past
nor leave it behind."1
I. NMTRODUCTION
Surprisingly, courts and commentators have infrequently discussed how an
individual's history of drug2 addiction may affect his or her ability to obtain
employment as a police officer, firefighter, or other public safety officer.3
1 W.H. AUDEN, Two Bestiaries: D.H. Lawrence, in TiE DYER'S HAND, AND OTHER
ESSAYS 278 (1962).
2 Throughout this Note, the term "drug" is used to denote any controlled substance under
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994), especially those drugs whose use,
possession, or distribution is prohibited under the Act. This definition is used under both the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6) (1994), and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,29 U.S.C.A. § 705(10)(A), (3) (1999). This Note does not address alcohol addiction.
3 The term "public safety officer" is used in this Note according to the definition provided
OHIO STATELAWJOURNAL
Perhaps it is simply assumed that in positions such as these, employers deserve
wide latitude in selecting individuals with the highest integrity.4 Even so, public
employers must comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which explicitly protect those
individuals who have been rehabilitated from employment discrimination. 5
Additionally, Title VII6 and the Fourteenth Amendment7 may provide protection
to applicants in these situations.
An employer, of course, is not compelled to hire an individual if the
applicant is not qualified for the position in question.8 Therefore, many state and
municipal civil service regulations assume that the absence of past drug
addiction9 is such a qualification for public safety officer positions. 10 These
employers often disqualify an applicant when, based on the applicant's own
admission or background check, it is revealed that the applicant previously used
in the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 706(12) (1994) (including those involved in the
enforcement of criminal laws; those having contact with criminal defendants, suspects,
prisoners, probationers, or parolees; and those engaged in firefighting, fire prevention, or
emergency rescue missions) It should be noted that the Rehabilitation Act was amended in
August 1998, see Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 1093, and this definition no longer appears in
the Act.
4 A recent opinion poll, for example, found that 61% of those surveyed felt that
individuals with histories of drug abuse should never be eligible for employment in certain
safety-sensitive positions. See Institute for a Drug-Free Workplace Gallup Survey (visited Feb.
2, 1998) <httpJ/www.drugfreeworkplace.org/survey/page47.html>.
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (1994); infra Part V.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1994).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994); 29 U.S.CA. § 705(20)(C)(ii)() (1999); infra Part V.
9 It is important to note that the terms "drug addiction" and "drug abuse" are used
interchangeably in this Note. Both terms are used to denote a condition that would rise to the
level of a "disability" for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See infra Part IMl.D. The
terms used in civil rights statutes, regulations, legislative history, and other sources may cause
some confusion and are therefore often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Burka v. New York
City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 600 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that "[t]o the extent
that there is a distinction between the terms, our holding today renders it a distinction without a
difference!' because any drug user who seeks treatment for the problem admits a "loss of
control" which makes the drug problem rise to a level that deserves protections under the
statute); cf. Richard H. Blum, Mind-Altering Drugs and Dangerous Behavior, in DEVIANCE
280 (Simon Dinitz et al. eds., 1969) (noting the "sophistry of distinction" made between the
terms, the author writes: "The critical point for us is the realization that [drug] 'use,' 'abuse,'
and 'risk' are emotionally charged terms that may be based on hidden determinants or open
assumptions that cannot be shown to have a factual basis.").
10 See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R134-105(A)(15) (1997) ('The person shall never have
illegally used dangerous drugs or narcotics other than for experimentation."); see also infra
Part M.C.
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illegal drugs.'1 The disqualification can even occur without regard to how many
years have lapsed since the applicant's last use of drugs.12 For example,
Lieutenant John Haas, director of personnel for the Arlington County (Virginia)
Police Department stated, "We do not accept any police candidate who has used
hard drugs, such as cocaine, heroin and PCP-even once .... It's a complete
disqualification factor." 13
With the proliferation of claims under the ADA in the last few years, it is
shocking to discover that few individuals 14 who have overcome drug addiction
and sought public safety officer positions have successfully challenged character
qualifications prefaced on the past addiction to illegal drugs. Justifications for
using an applicant's addiction history as a job qualification may appear rational,
but are directly contrary to the purposes of civil rights statutes. This dichotomy
I1 Although the discussion in this Note is limited to applicants for public safety officer
positions, there are also a number of private jobs that are so safety-sensitive (such as certain
jobs at nuclear power plants, oil refineries, etc.) that, if an applicant's background check
revealed a history of drug abuse, the individual would most likely not be given further
consideration. This Note does not express an opinion on the propriety of drug abuse history
qualifications in these situations (although some of the same issues would arise). For a
discussion of that topic, see Jon Cheney, Comment, EEOC v. Exxon Corp.: Will Excon's
Blanket Exclusion of Former Substance Abusers Hold Up Under the ADA?, 48 BAYLOR L.
REV. 549 (1996). Discussing the legality of Exxon's policy of excluding all former drug
abusers from employment in safety-sensitive positions (adopted after the Exxon Valdez
disaster), the author concludes that blanket exclusions should be permitted in certain situations
and that the ADA's preference for individualized determinations should give way to other
public policy considerations. See id. at 569-73. It should be noted that the conclusion in that
Comment is different than the one reached later in this Note.
12See, e.g., FLA. ADMN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011(2) (1997) ('The unlawful use of
any of the controlled substances... by an applicant for certification, employment, or
appointment, at any time proximate to such application ... conclusively establishes that the
applicant is not of good moral character as required by [Florida statutes].") (emphasis added);
see also infra Part III.C.
13 Arlo Wagner, Keeping Users OffForce: Police Urge State to be Strict on Recruits'
Pasts, WASH. TIMFS, Jan. 24, 1997, at C9 (quoting Lt. Haas).
14 Understanding the importance of terminology, I have tried to use the "people first"
approach to the language in this Note. Such an approach puts the "personhood identifier" (such
as individual, person, people) before the explanation of their "differentness," see JOSEPH P.
SHAPIRO, No Prry: PEOPLE WITH DISABILIIES FORGING ANEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 184,
186-89, 197-201 (1993), creating the phrases used in this Note: "individual who has overcome
drug addiction" or "individual who has been rehabilitated." Although more words are used this
way, and it may sound awkward at times, I feel it is important to use language this way because
"[a]n individual is not exclusively any one of the things he has or the things he does.... He is,
above all, a person." HARRY SANDS & FRANCES C. MINTERS, TIM EPILEPSY FACt BOOK 49
(1977). For an excellent discussion of this issue, see ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., DIsABILrrY
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENTLAW 15-23 (1995).
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raises interesting questions: Are individuals with histories of drug addiction
protected when municipalities discriminate against them because of events that
took place years ago? On the other hand, what would be the effects if
municipalities were required by law to hire police officers and firefighters whose
backgrounds reveal extensive drug usage? Would the community at large regard
individuals with histories of drug addiction unfit for the high calling of civil
service?
In an attempt to answer these questions, this Note focuses on the legality of
using an individual's drug addiction history as a qualification for public safety
officer employment and argues that, regardless of one's personal views on the
subject, the current state of the law prohibits public employers 15 from using
drug abuse history to disqualify a rehabilitated individual from public safety
officer positions. Part III explains the medical recognition of drug addiction as a
disease, regulations relied on by public employers to exclude individuals with
histories of drug addiction from public safety officer positions, and the
congressional treatment of drug addiction as a disability. Parts IV and V discuss
the laws protecting individuals who have been rehabilitated from drug addiction.
Part VI explores the justifications for drug addiction history disqualifications
and, using principles from case law, illustrates the risk involved in maintaining
such policies. This Note concludes with a recommendation for public employers
that serves the same purposes of drug addiction history qualifications, but offers
less risk of liability. Before further discussion, however, a scenario based on an
actual case 16 is necessary to illustrate the issues addressed in this Note and
provide a context for analysis.
I. THE SCENARIO
John admits to regularly abusing illegal drugs while serving in the military
ten years ago.17 Although never professionally diagnosed as an "addict," the
15 The term "public employers" is used in this Note to mean any entity that hires public
safety officers. This definition could include state governments, municipalities, etc. This Note
does not specifically address the federal government.
16 The actual case on which this scenario is based is in the beginning stages of litigation in
Columbus, Ohio, with cross motions for summary judgment pending as this is written.
17 Based on studies about drug abuse in the military, see, e.g., MICHAEL D. NEWCOM'B,
DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE: RISK FACrORS FOR DISRUPTIVE SUBSTANCE USE AMONG
YOUNG ADULTS 8-10 (1988); Drug Abuse in the Military: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 99th Cong. (1985), it is quite probable that this scenario represents the experiences
of many men and women. Although this scenario mentions the military, all individuals with a
history of drug addition could, of course, be included in this discussion. It has been recently
estimated that there are about 13 million Americans who currently use illegal drugs. See U.S.
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circumstances surrounding his drug abuse would probably be considered
addiction by most definitions.18 He was never caught or disciplined for this drug
addiction, and it never affected the performance of his military duties. In fact, he
has received commendations for his excellent military record. John has never
used illegal drugs since his honorable discharge from military duty. Now, ten
years after his discharge, John applied for a police officer position with his city.
He appears qualified in every respect. In fact, he made the eligibility list and,
because of his position on the list, was expected to be chosen for the position in a
few months.
In one stage of the application process, however, John truthfully admitted his
past drug usage and explained his total rehabilitation from drug addiction.
Because of John's history, the city removed his name from the eligibility list,
pursuant to the jurisdiction's civil service regulations. The city did not assume
that John was currently using drugs or that he could not perform the functions of
a police officer. The only reason the city gave for his disqualification was that a
history of drug use, according to the civil service regulations, demonstrated a
lack of "respect for the law"--an "essential function" of the police officer
position. According to the city, no other reason for disqualification was legally
necessary.
Dep't of Health & Human Services, Substance Abuse-A National Challenge (visited Mar. 14,
1998) <http-//vww.health.org/mtf/hhsfact.htm>. For a discussion of the difficulties of
determining the actual number of drug addicts in the United States, see The Stanton Peele
Addiction Web Site, How Many Addicts are There in the U.S. and How is the Drug War
Affecting This Number? (visited Sept. 17, 1998) <http'/vww.peele.net/faq/addicts.html>.
18 See, e.g., Ronald M. Paolino, Identifying, Treating, and Counseling Drug Abusers, in
DRUG TESTING: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 215, 218 (Robert H. Coombs & Louis Jolyon West eds.,
1991) (noting that not all drug abusers become addicts; three criteria are identified for defining
addiction: loss of control in using the drug, craving and compulsion, and continued use despite
adverse consequences); DAVID A. PETRS, THE PROBABILITY OF ADDICTION: LEGAL, MEDICAL
AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONs 35-38 (1997) (explaining the difference between drug use and drug
addiction).
Defining addiction becomes important, as will be discussed later, because the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), which prohibits employment
discrimination against individuals with a "disability," defines disability as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual."
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). It is doubtful that occasional use of an illegal drug would ever fit into
the ADA's definition of "disability." See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNnY
COMMSSION, EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 8.5 (1992) [hereinafter TEClNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL]. For further discussion of drug addiction as a disability, see infra Part
M.D.
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Ut. THE DISABILITY OF ADDICTION AND ITS MORAL OVERTONES
A threshold inquiry is whether or not drug addiction itself is a disability.
Although much has been written on this topic,19 and it seems generally not to
pose much difficulty for courts,20 a brief discussion is warranted at the outset
because of the perceived connection between drug addiction and character traits
relevant to public safety officer qualifications.
A. The Medical Recognition ofDrug-Related Disabilities
The recognition of drug addiction as a disability worthy of protection under
civil rights legislation arises from the development of scientific knowledge about
disease.21 Decades ago, it was almost universally believed that drug addiction
reflected personal failures and inadequacies. 22 And, although many today would
19 See, e.g., DRUG ADDICTION AND ITS TREATMENT: NExus OF NEUROSCIENCE AND
BEHAVIOR (Bankole A. Johnson & John D. Roache eds., 1997); Reese John Henderson, Jr.,
Addiction As Disability: The Protection ofAlcoholics and Drug Addicts Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990,44 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1991).
20 See, e.g., Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (noting that individuals
addicted to drugs are "diseased and proper subjects for... treatment); School Bd. of Nassau
County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,285 n.14 (1987) (explaining that Congress understood
drug addiction as a disability); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 1226, 1231 n.8
(7th Cir. 1980) ("Individuals with current problems or histories of alcoholism or drug abuse
qualify as 'handicapped individuals....'); National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan,
685 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (E.D. La. 1988) ("Alcoholism or other drug abuse are considered
handicapping conditions under [the Rehabilitation Act]."); Grimes v. United States Postal
Serv., 872 F. Supp. 668, 675 (W.D. Mo. 1994) ("The Rehabilitation Act is designed to protect
a drug addict who voluntarily identifies his problem, seeks assistance, and stops using illegal
drugs." (citation omitted)).
2 1 See, e.g., HAROLD E. DOWEIKO, CONCEPTS OF CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY 6-9, 208-44
(3d ed. 1996) (explaining the evolving concept of addiction and the general recognition of
addiction as a medical disorder); Luiz R.S. Simmons & Martin B. Gold, Notes Toward a
General Theory ofAddict Rehabilitation, in DISCRIMINATION AND THE ADDICT 11 (Luiz R.S.
Simmons et al. eds., 1973) (citations omitted) ("Unquestionably public policy toward the
narcotic addict has changed dramatically. The addict is, at least in theory, no longer the peculiar
problem of law enforcement, as a general recognition that the addict may be a sick or diseased
person has permeated public policy and increasingly private attitudes.").
22 See LUIZ R.S. SIMMONS & MARTIN B. GOLD, DISCRIMINATION AND THE ADDICT 12
(Luiz R.S. Simmons & Martin B. Gold eds., 1973); cf. Jeffrey A. Schaler, Drugs and Free
Will, SOCIETY, SeptiOct. 1991, at 42-44. But cf. SIMON DINITZ ET AL., DEVIANCE 277 (1969)
("Because [drug] use is labeled deviant, criminal, and outside legitimate medical practice, users
develop a life style quite far removed from that of straight society. The roles, statuses,
functioning, and self-concepts of the users are derived from this subculture. Quite apart from
the effects of the drugs, it is this involvement and participation in a deviant subculture which
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still agree that there are personal contributors to the individual's illness, a large
and growing number of medical professionals recognize that addiction is a
disease, complete with complex biological factors.
Drug addiction has been legally recognized as a disability for decades,23 and
current scientific research continues to validate this position.24 Time magazine,
which recently published an article on current research into addiction, reports:
As scientists learn more about how dopamine [a molecule that transmits
messages from one neuron to another] works (and how drugs work on it), the
evidence suggests that we may be fighting the wrong battle. Americans tend to
think of drug addiction as a failure of character. But this stereotype is beginning
to give way to the recognition that drug dependence has a clear biological basis.
"Addiction... is a disorder of the brain no different from other forms of mental
illness."25
Additionally, in a recent report from the National Institute of Health, medical
authorities recognized that once an individual is dependent on a drug, such
dependence constitutes a medical disorder.26 As mounting research continues to
nullifies most treatment efforts and leads to the high rates of return to drug use after
treatment.').
2 3 See, e.g., Linder, 268 U.S. at 18 (noting that individuals addicted to drugs are "diseased
and proper subjects for... treatment"); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 795-96 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (noting that "[i]t is undisputed that drug addiction substantially affects an addict's ability
to perform major life activities," which qualifies an individual who is addicted to drugs for
protection under the statutes); Whitaker v. Board. of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99, 106 n.7
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (explaining that the protections of the Rehabilitation Act extend to individuals
addicted to drugs); 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 75 (1977) (stating that Congress intended to include
individuals with drug addictions within the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act).
24 See, e.g., NORMAN S. MILLER, ADDICION PSYCHIATRY: CURRENT DIAGNOsIs AND
TREATMENT 81-105 (1995); Frank R. George, The Genetics of.Addiction, in DRUG ADDICriON
AND ris TREATMENT: NExus OF NEUROSClENCE AND BEHAVIOR 187, 201-02 (Bankole A.
Johnson et al. eds., 1997) (explaining the biological factors of the disease of addiction, the
author writes that although there is no "addiction gene," there is a "biological contribution" to
drug addiction that results from the interactions among several genes).
25 j. Madeleine Nash, Addicted: Why do People Get Hooked? Mounting Evidence Points
to a Powerful Brain Chemical Called Dopamine, TIME, May 5, 1997, at 68, 70 (quoting Dr.
Nora Volkow of the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York); see also id. at 74 (noting
also that "[f]or years scientists have suspected that genes play a critical role in determining who
vill become addicted to drugs and who will not. But not until now have they had molecular
tools powerful enough to go after the prime suspects.... Several dopamine genes have already
been tentatively, and controversially, linked to alcoholism and drag abuse.").
26 See National Institute of Health, Effective Medical Treatment of Heroin Addiction, NIH
Consensus Statement No. 108 (Nov. 17-19, 1997) (visited Jan. 14, 1999)
<http://odp.od.nih.gov/consensuscon/108/108_intro.htn> [hereinafter NIH Consensus
1999]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
validate the trealment of addiction as a medical disease,27 its status as a disability
for purposes of civil rights protections is further justified.
B. Criticisms of Treating Drug Addiction as a Protected Disability
The classification of drug addiction as a disability is not without its critics.
Some point to the appearance of a double standard. What message would the
nation be sending if America, on one hand, wages the "War on Drugs" and, on
the other, protects individuals who have been addicted to illegal drugs from
employment discrimination?28 How can America make clear its policies of drug-
related law enforcement while at the same time protect those who provide a
market for drugs in this country? And how can employers establish and maintain
drug-free workplace policies in the face of liability when they refuse to hire
individuals who have previously been addicted to drugs?29 Additionally, would
employers be exposed to negligent hiring claims if they were to hire individuals
who were formerly addicted to illegal drugs-whose possible relapse may result
in injury to third parties?30
Indeed, legislators raised such concerns in the congressional debates over the
ADA, noting that offering protection to individuals addicted to illegal drugs may
Statement] (although dealing solely with addiction to opiates, this statement is equally
applicable to addiction to other drugs).
27 See MILLEP, supra note 24, at 81.
28 For example, Senator Helms made the following statements on the floor of Congress
during the debates over the provisions of the ADA dealing with drug addiction:
On Tuesday night we launched a war on drugs. Both President Bush and our colleague,
Mr. Biden, committed themselves and their parties to eliminating the scourge of drugs
from our streets. I think there is no better time than now to start this bipartisan battle for
the very soul of our Nation. It is time to put our rhetoric into action. We can start by
getting tough and smart with drug addicts.
135 CONG. REc. 19,874 (1989) (statement by Sen. Helms) (emphasis added).
29 Senator Harkin sought, during the Congressional debates over the ADA, to allay this
concern: "I think we can assure... employers, without hesitation, that employers will not face
litigation under the ADA on the part of current users of illegal drugs and alcohol either for
testing or for taking disciplinary action against such individuals based on such testing." 135
CONG. REC. 19,877 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (emphasis added).
30 Generally, the standard for negligent hiring is that an employer will be liable for
injuries caused by employees to third parties when the employer could reasonably foresee,
based on employee background checks, that the injury may occur. See, e.g., Logan v. West
Coast Benson Hotel, 981 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Or. 1997); Lester v. Town of Wintrop, 939 P.2d
1237 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); Pruitt v. Pavelin, 685 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
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thwart employers' efforts to maintain a drug free workplace.31 In spite of these
criticisms, Congress extended the ADA's protections to individuals who have
been rehabilitated from drug addition. As will be discussed, many of the
criticisms can be answered effectively when one separates the medical disability
of addiction from an individual's status as an addict.32 In addition, the laws do
not protect individuals currently using drugs (including those currently addicted),
but only those who no longer use drugs or who are in a rehabilitation program.33
Other criticisms revolve around the perceived voluntary nature of drug use
leading to addiction. For example, one critic of the disease model of drug
addiction wrote: 'Drug addicts simply have different values from the norm and
often refuse to take responsibility for their actions. Public policy based on the
disease model of addiction enables this avoidance to continue by sanctioning it in
the name of helping people."34 If the individual would not have started, the critic
says, he or she would not now be addicted.35 Indeed, professionals have noted
the difficulty in determining whether the root of drug addiction is a medical
disorder, such as a genetic predisposition, or some other combination of
31 See, for example, the statements of Senator Helms criticizing the ADA's protection of
individuals with drug addictions:
Many [employers] have adopted get tough policies against drug addicts, but as a
consequence of the Rehabilitation Act, they have been forced by the Federal authorities to
change their policies and to even take back.. . employees whom they have expelled or
fired for repeated drug violations.... It is exceedingly difficult to confront and discipline
a member of a "protected class" who is subject to the extensive and complete procedural
safeguards of the Rehabilitation Act.
135 CONG. REc. 19,874 (1989) (statement by Sen. Helms).
32 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
33 See infra Part lf.D.
34 Schaler, supra note 22, at 42, 49; cf. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739,
746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (comparing the voluntary nature of plaintiff's muscular physique
resulting from bodybuilding, which put him over the weight limit for a flight attendant
position, to drug addiction). The court in Tudyman noted that although drug addiction has been
recognized as voluntary, it is still covered by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA because
Congress so provided. See id. (citing Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978)). But
cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.9 (1962) (noting that addiction may not be a
voluntary condition and explaining: "Not only may addiction innocently result from the use of
medically prescribed narcotics, but a person may even be a narcotics addict from the moment
of his birth."); id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The first step to addiction may be as
innocent as a boy's puff on a cigarette in an alleyway. It may come from medical prescriptions.
Addiction may even be present at birth.").
35 This exemplifies the nineteenth-century notion that disease "is a product of will" and
that "the presence of disease signifies that the will itself is sick." SusAN SONTAG, ILLNESS As
METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITs METAPHORS 43 (1990).
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sociological, psychological, or economic factors.36 The mystery surrounding the
roots of addiction is perhaps why critics are quicker to let the individual bear the
onus of blame for his or her perceived social and moral wrongs.37
Although progress has been made, the separation of drug addiction from its
moral overtones is far from complete. The perceived connection between one's
drug use and his or her character is reminiscent of the out-dated belief that all
illnesses and disabilities are a "product of a will or a choice."38 One
commentator recently noted that "[t]he identification of a pathological mental
state or character has left us with a lingering sense of personal responsibility for
certain illnesses."39 Surely drug addiction is such an illness. Drug abusers are
often perceived as manipulative, sociopathic troublemakers.40 This may not be
an accurate portrayal of the individual addicted to drugs,41 especially one who
has been rehabilitated.
C. Policing Character: Civil Service Regulations and Drug Abuse History
Most state and local employers in charge of hiring public safety officers are
guided by laws and regulations that purport to give them authority to exclude
individuals with drug histories from certain positions. A great number of the
regulations requiring applicants to be free from drug abuse histories do so as a
proxy for the applicant's moral character.
Many varieties of laws and regulations that relate to former drug use or
addiction exist. Some make any previous drug use dispositive of bad character or
otherwise disqualify an applicant. For example, the Florida Administrative Code
states: "The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances... by an applicant
for certification, employment, or appointment, at any time proximate to such
application for certification, employment, or appointment, conclusively
3 6 See NIH Consensus Statement, supra note 26; DOWEIKO, supra note 21, at 208-44.
37 See SONTAG supra note 35, at 61 ("And it is diseases thought to be multi-determined
(that is, mysterious) that have the widest possibilities as metaphors for what is felt to be socially
or morally wrong.").
3 8 Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a
Moral Code, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1451, 1455 (1994); see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 669 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); Schaler, supra note 22, at 42 ('The moralistic model
[considers] addiction ... to be [the] result of low moral standards, bad character, and weak will.
Treatment consists of punishment for drug-using behavior. The punitive nature of America's
current war on drugs with its call for 'user accountability' is typical of the moralistic
perspective. Addicts are viewed as bad people who need to be rehabilitated in 'boot camps.'
They are said to be lacking in values.").
39 Hiegel, supra note 38, at 1456.




establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character.42 Although
specifying that drug use at any time before the application "conclusively
establishes" that the applicant is not qualified for the position, the statute's effect
is softened somewhat by the next sentence of the regulation. It reads:
The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances specified... by an
applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application, may or
may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral
character.... depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the
frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use.43
Applicants who have been rehabilitated for a number of years, therefore, could
conceivably escape the determination that they are not of good moral character. 44
The impact of this provision is not known because of the lack of reported cases
on the subject Unlike a blanket exclusion (which Florida municipalities may still
have), this provision appears to provide the trier of fact with the opportunity to
assess applicants on a case-by-case basis-something that the Florida courts
have stated is desirable.45 The "conclusively establishes" language, however, is
still troublesome. At least one Florida court has strictly construed similar
language in other civil service regulations. 46
Although the Florida regulation explicitly defines good moral character to
4 2 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011(2) (1997) (emphasis added); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. 943.13(7) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (stating that all law enforcement and correction
officers shall have "good moral character as determined by a background investigation under
procedures established by the commission").
For additional examples of statutes that explicitly tie drug abuse with moral character, see
Mo. REv. STAT. § 590.135(4) (1998) (similar to Washington); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-6-
440(B)(5) (Law Co-op. 1996) ("In the director's determination of good character, the director
shall also give consideration to all law violations .... The director shall also give consideration
to the candidate's prior history, if any, of alcohol and drug abuse in arriving at a determination
of good character.'); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 415-104-688(c) & (d) & 415-104-740(4)(c) & (d)
(1997) (mentioning drug addiction and the use of drugs as conditions that disqualify applicants.
No further detail is given in the regulations about whether this refers to current or past drug
addiction, or both.).
4 3 FLA. ADMIN. CoDEANN. r. 1 1B-27.0011(2) (1997).
44 The Florida courts have noted that the determination of applicant's good moral
character under this regulation is an issue for the trier of fact. See Albert v. Dep't of Law
Enforcement, Criminal Justice Stnds and Training Comm'n, 573 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
4 5 See Cimigliaro v. Florida Police Standards & Training Comm'n, 409 So. 2d 80, 85
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that "[i]t is unfortunate that the legislature has not provided
in the statute for instances of rehabilitation").
4 6 See id.
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exclude past drug use, many other regulations are not as specific. For example,
the South Dakota Administrative Code (like that of many states) reads, "A
person may not be temporarily or permanently employed or certified as a law
enforcement officer or continue to be employed or certified as a law enforcement
officer unless he meets the following requirements: ... Is of good moral
character."47 Any regulation that requires good moral character may be used to
exclude individuals with drug histories. The difficulty in obtaining information
about the underlying reason for rejecting public safety officer applicants makes it
impossible to determine how pervasive the drug-free history requirement is in
practice.
This difficulty is amplified in the states that only specify minimum
qualifications for public safety officers and leave more stringent qualifications up
to local governments. 48 Ohio, for example, leaves it to the discretion of the
4 7 S.D. ADMIN. R. 2:01:02:01 (1997); see also, e.g., Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 2.01(1)(f)
(1997) ('The applicant shall be of good moral character.").
4 8 See, e.g., WEL's CODE OF WYOMING RULES 015-080-002 § l(f) ("The standards set
forth in [the Wyoming statutes], concerning peace officer andlor detention officer
qualifications shall be deemed minimum standards and in no way preclude counties, cities, or
towns from establishing higher employment standards."); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 2.01(4) ("The
foregoing are minimum qualifications. Higher qualifications are strongly recommended where
the employing authority is in a position to require them."). Prompted by a change in policy at
the Prince George's County Police Department, which opened opportunities in the police
department for individuals with drug abuse histories, the Maryland legislature passed a law that
gave local governments more discretion over police qualifications. See Wagner, supra note 13,
at C9; H.B. 307, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997), available in LEXIS at 1997 Bill Text MD H.B.
307 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., Executive Dep't § 4-201 (Supp. 1997)). Although the bill
was enacted, significant changes were made, which included deleting most references to an
applicant's drug abuse history. See id. § 4-203 (A)-(D).
An example of more stringent qualification standards established by local governments
can be found in the "Guidelines for Background Monitoring of Police Officer and Firefighter
Applicants" section of the civil service regulations for the city of Columbus, Ohio: "Any usage
of certain drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, LSD, crack, crank, PCP, may be cause for rejection.
Any habitual or pattern of drug usage, even as juvenile or a long time ago, may be cause for
rejection." COLUMBUS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO, RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF TIE MUNICIPAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1987 & amendments through
1996). Although the Columbus civil service commission states in the regulations that these
standards were made with an attempt to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act, see
id., such an assertion is unpersuasive in light of the fact that the "any habitual use' standard-
which, of course, would include past addiction to drugs regardless of whether or not the
individual has been rehabilitated-is directly contrary to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The
statutes protect individuals who have been rehabilitated from drug addiction. See 42 U.S.C.
§12114(a) (1994); 29 U.S.C.A § 705(20)(C)(ii) (1999); infra Part V.
In addition to local government regulations, contracts with unions, such as the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP), may prohibit a municipality from accepting applicants with histories of
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Administrative Services Director to disqualify an applicant who "has been guilty
of infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct."49 This, of course, could include
past drug addiction.
Although these types of laws leave a great deal of discretion regarding an
applicant's history of drug use, they should not necessarily be considered more
benign.50 In fact, a similar regulation that left it to the discretion of the civil
service director to disqualify an applicant who "either during or after an
examiation... is addicted to the intemperate use of intoxicating liquors, or the
use of harmful drugs" was interpreted by the city officials to include all past drug
users. The effect of more general standards also can be seen in the following
statement by a New York court:
Although appointments to the uniformed force of the State Police are governed
by... the New York State Constitution and by applicable provisions of the Civil
Service Law, sole authority for the examination, qualification and appointment
of members is vested in the Superintendent of State Police by virtue of the
Executive Law..., [which] requires that any person appointed as a State
Trooper be possessed of fitness and good moral character.... Thus, the
Superintendent had the power and authority to determine, as a matter of
discretion, the "fitness and good moral character" of the petitioner as a
qualification of such appointment The exercise of this discretion, as long as it is
drug addiction. See Timothy R. Gaffiey, Judge Blocks Police Recruits, DAYrON DAILY NEWS,
May 19, 1997, at lB ('The FOP maintains that Dayton's Civil Service Board violated a 1995
contract between the FOP and the city by accepting the recruits, who have admitted using
illegal drugs in the past. The contract prohibits the city from hiring any police officer who ever
used any illegal drug other than marijuana... '); Lou Grieco, FOP Files Grievance on Drug
Policy, DAYTON DAILYNEvs, Mar. 11, 1997, at 2B.
49 OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.25 (Anderson 1997), reprinted in Ofio CIVIL SERVICE &
COLLECnVE BARGAINING: LAWS & RULES ANNOTATED 192 (Jonathan J. Downes ed. 1997).
The Ohio rule specifies that anyone "who is addicted to the habitual use of... drugs in excess"
can also be disqualified. Id.; see also ALA. CODE § 36-26-15(a) (1996) (similar to Ohio); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 5.1191(110) (1997) (similar to Ohio); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 46183 (1997) & 37
PA. CODE § 203.11 (1997) (similar to Ohio); TENN. CODE ANN. 8-30-305 (1997) (similar to
Ohio); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 29, § 8914 (1996) ("Applications shall also be rejected if the
applicant... has a record of court convictions or infamous or other conduct which renders the
applicant unsuitable for employment."); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-8-7.1(a) (1997) ('The council
shall have the authority to refuse to grant a certification to an applicant... upon a
determination by the council that the applicant.., has: ... Committed a crime involving moral
turpitude, without regard to conviction .... Violated or attempted to violate a law, rule, or
regulation of this state, any other state, the council, the United States, or any other authority
without regard to whether the violation is criminally punishable.... Committed any act or
omission which is indicative of bad moral character or untrustworthiness.").
50 See Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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rational, is not prohibited by the constitutional provisions relating to the Civil
Service. 5 1
A more detailed law may actually be beneficial to an applicant with a history
of drug addiction. For example, in Illinois, an applicant for a firefighter position
who admitted prior drug use was denied employment.52 However, the court
found that this denial was contrary to the state civil service laws, which provided
a detailed list of all conduct that would disqualify an applicant.53 Past use or
possession of marijuana was not listed and, therefore, could not be used to deny
the applicant employment.54
Other states do not mention moral character per se, but specify the number
of years an individual has to have been drug free, the extent of past drug use, or
the type of drug necessary for disqualification. California provides an example of
this type of regulation: "Any applicant for a State civil service examination for a
peace officer class who discloses or whose background investigation reveals use
of a drug for which possession would constitute a felony... subsequent to his or
her eighteenth birthday shall be disqualified from the examination ... unless 10
years have elapsed from the date of the disclosed use of the drug."'55 Thus, under
51 Shedlock v. Connelie, 414 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
5 2 See Murbach v. Anderson, 422 N.E.2d 41,42 (Il. App. Ct. 1981).
53 See id. at 44.
5 4 See id. at 44-45.
5 5 CAL. CODERE-Gs. tit. 2, § 213.5 (1997). A more detailed regulation specifying years of
abstinence and extent of drug use is found in Arizona. It specifies:
10. The person shall not have illegally used marijuana for any
purpose within the past three years.
11. The person shall never have illegally used marijuana other than
for experimentation.
12. The person shall never have illegally used marijuana while
employed or appointed as a peace officer....
14. The person shall not have illegally used dangerous drugs or
narcotics, other than marijuana, for any purpose within the
past seven years.
15. The person shall never have illegally used dangerous drugs or
narcotics other than for experimentation.
16. The person shall never have illegally used dangerous drugs or
narcotics while employed or appointed as a peace officer....
B. The use of an illegal drug is presumed to be not for
experimentation if:
1. The use of marijuana exceeds a total of 20 times or exceeds five
times since the age of 21 years.
2. The use of dangerous drugs or narcotics, other than marijuana,
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this regulation, an individual's drug use before he or she turns eighteen is not
considered, and the individual must have been drug free for ten years before the
application.
D. Congressional Treatment ofDrug Addiction as a Disability
The legality of many of the above state and local regulations is questionable
in light of the congressional understanding of drug addiction as a disability. In
spite of the debates about the nature of addiction, Congress has determined that
for the purposes of civil rights laws, drug addiction must be considered a
disability.56 This position not only exhibits the national recognition of the
prevalence of drug addiction in society and compassion for individuals who are
addicted to illegal substances, but it is also believed to be a necessary element in
the nation's attack on the drug problem itself.57
Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act cover drug addiction. The ADA's
definition of "disability" includes the following language: "The term 'disability'
means... a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of [an] individual; [or] a record of
such... impairment; [or] being regarded as having such an impairment."58 The
Rehabilitation Act which applies to the federal government and other entities
receiving federal funds,59 uses similar language. 60 Courts, Congress, and
exceeds a total of five times, or exceeds one time since the age
of 21 years.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R13-4-105 (1997).
The Utah regulations are also interesting. Although the statute states that drug addiction is
cause for denial of certification of a peace officer, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-6-21 1(1)(d)(iii)
(1994 & Supp. 1997), the regulations appear to make room for individuals who have their
addiction "under control." See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R728-409-3(D)(2)(b) (1997) ("No
applicant shall be granted peace officer certification or authority if it is demonstrated that the
applicant has a drug addiction which is not under control.").
56 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 ("It is
not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions, diseases, or
infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments.... The term [disability]
includes, however, such conditions.., as ... drug addiction."); accord H.R REP. No. 101-
485(1), at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22; see also,
e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 685 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (E.D. La. 1988)
("Alcoholism or other drug abuse are considered handicapping conditions under [the
statutes].'); infra Part III.D.
57 Henderson, supra note 19, at 736.
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A)-(B) (1994).
5 9 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
60 When enacted in 1973, the Rehabilitation Act used the term "handicap." See
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commentators have made clear that these two pieces of legislation are intended
to overlap so that one can rely on precedent established under either the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act when interpreting certain provisions, such as what constitutes
a disability under either statute.61
Drug addiction was explicitly cited in the congressional committee reports as
a "physical or mental impairment" that falls within this definition of disability.62
According to the above definition, however, having a physical or mental
impairment alone is not sufficient; the impairment must "substantially limit[ ]
one or more of the major life activities of [the] individual. '63 In keeping with the
understanding of how addiction would fit under the term disability and the
intention of Congress, 64 however, this requirement should be no more difficult to
meet. Congress explained that major life activities include such things as
working, walking, and seeing.6 5 Clearly an individual addicted to illegal drugs
(thus meeting the "physical or mental impairment" requirement) should not have
difficulty convincing anyone that the drug use substantially limited one of these
activities. 66 The effects of drug abuse on simple tasks are well documented 67
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-111, 87 Stat. 355. Because the term handicap is
now considered offensive, the 1992 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act replaced the term
"handicap" with "disability." See Rehabilitation Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 102-569,
§ 706(8), 106 Stat. 4348-49 (1992). The ADA also uses the term "disability." See H.R. REP.
No. 101-485(11), at 50, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332 ('The use of the term
'disability' instead of 'handicap' . . . represents an effort by the Committee to make use of up-
to-date, currently accepted terminology.... Congress has been apprised of the fact that to
many individuals with disabilities the terminology applied to them is a very significant and
sensitive issue.).
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1994) ('The standards used to determine whether this section
has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall
be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."); see also
Gile v. United Airlines, 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1996); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d
723 (5th Cir. 1995); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995); Eric Harbrook Cottrell,
There's Too Much Confusion Here, and I Can't Get No Relief. Alcoholic Employees and the
Federal Rehabilitation Act in Little v. FBI, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1753 (1994); John L. Flynn,
Mixed-Motive Causation Under The ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear
Statements, 83 GEo. L.L 2009 (1995).
62 See supra note 56.
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A)-(B) (1994); 29 U.S.CA. § 705(a)(B) (1999).
64 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
333-34; 135 CONG. REC. 19,873-77 (1989).
65 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51-52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333-
34.
66 See, e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 795-96 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (noting that "it is
undisputed that drug addiction substantially affects an addict's ability to perform major life
activities," which qualifies an individual who is addicted to drugs for protection under the
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and, thanks to drug education programs, 68 well known.
The ADA also defines disability as having "a record of' a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.69 Individuals who have
previously been addicted to drugs, but who have since been (or are being)
rehabilitated, would be considered disabled under this provision of the ADA as
well-even though they may no longer be substantially limited in a major life
activity.70 The third category of the definition of disability-being regarded as
having a disability-may also be applicable. Any concerns about the possibility
statutes); Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 127 F.3d 270,273 (2d Cir. 1997)
(noting that if a person establishes past addiction, "recovering addicts, so long as they are not
currently using drugs, will automatically be covered under § 12101(2)(B)" [the substantial
limitation of a major life activity requirement] (emphasis added)); Johnson v. St. Clare's Hosp.
& Health Cir., 1998 WL 213203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1998) ('In other words, a
recovering alcoholic [or drug addict] need not show that one or more of his major life activities
is currently impaired by alcohol [or drug] use in order to be protected from
discrimination....').
67 See generally DOUGLAS W. MATHESON & MERIDrrH A. DAVISON, THE BEHAVIORAL
EFFECTS OF DRUGS (1972).
68 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7105 (1994) ("The Safe and Drug Free Schools and
Communities Act of 1994").
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
70 See, e.g., Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438, 442 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (explaining that 'a history of addiction' is intended to be a protected disability");
Buckley, 127 F.3d at 270 (holding that an employee's status as a "recovering drug addict" was
a disability under the ADA).
The Supreme Court summed up the logic of including past drug addiction in the legal
understanding of a covered disability:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not only those who
are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as
a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that
society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as
are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment... Congress reaffirmed this
approach in its 1978 amendments to the [Rehabilitation] Act There, Congress recognized
that employers and other grantees might have legitimate reasons not to extend jobs or
benefits to drug addicts and alcoholics, but also understood the danger of improper
discrimination against such individuals if they were categorically excluded from coverage
under the Act Congress therefore rejected the original House proposal to exclude addicts
and alcoholics from the definition of handicapped individual, and instead adopted the
Senate proposal excluding only those alcoholics and drug abusers "whose current use of
alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from perforning the duties of the job in
question or whose employment.., would constitute a direct threat to property or the
safety of others."
School Bd. of Nassau Co. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284,285 n.14 (1987).
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of the rehabilitated applicant's relapse can be used to assert that the employer
regarded the applicant as being disabled. Although these provisions clearly
protect individuals who have been rehabilitated from drug addiction and have
ceased drug abuse,71 many public employers still exclude individuals who have
overcome drug addiction from employment.72 Are they breaking the law?
71 Determining that drug addiction is a disability for the purposes of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act does not mean that the statute automatically protects all individuals who are
addicted to drugs. As will be discussed in Part V, specific provisions of the ADA deal with
those currently engaged in drug use by stating that they are not to be considered qualified. The
treatment of drug addiction as a disability has been summed up by noting that the statutes do
"not exclude addiction from the definition of handicaps [or disabilities]; rather, [they]
exclude[ ] from the definition of 'otherwise qualified' those addicts who fall within one of the
specific exceptions." Henderson, supra note 19, at 730 n.130. This position is supported when
one considers the language and structure of the ADA, which excludes current drug users from
the definition of "qualified individual with a disability," 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1994), but not
from the definition of "disability" itself. On the other hand, the Rehabilitation Act's structure is
somewhat different. It states that "the term 'individual with a disability' does not include an
individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs. See 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 705(20)(C)(i) (1999). Thus it appears that, for the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, the
current use of drugs, whether or not rising to the level of addiction, is not a disability. Even
though the language of the Rehabilitation Act may not as clearly support the above notion that
addiction is a disability but individuals currently addicted to drugs are not "qualified" under the
statutes, Congress most likely intended the same interpretation of drug addiction in both acts,
see supra note 61, and therefore it is safe to say that drug addiction alone is sufficient to meet
the "disability" requirement of both Acts.
72 Some may wonder just how employers find out about the nature and extent of an
applicant's drug abuse history. Typically, applicant's for public safety officer positions are
asked at some point during the application process to disclose such information. Many
individuals who have been rehabilitated, feeling that it is important to be truthful-and
possibly believing that they are protected from discrimination-give detailed histories of their
drug abuse. See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, Civ. No. 5-84-131, 1985 WL 4998, at *1 (D. Minn.
Dec. 13, 1985) (applicant stated on employment questionnaire that he "used marijuana almost
daily from 1969 to 1977, that he had used speed 50 to 70 times, LSD 10 times, hash 50 to 100
times, downers 5 times, and alcohol frequently").
The fact that applicants for certain public safety officer positions are asked to disclose
information that could reveal a past disability-addiction-raises additional concerns under the
disability discrimination statutes that, unfortunately, cannot be discussed at length in this Note.
Basically, however, an employer is only permitted to ask about issues directly relevant to the
essential functions of the job. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(2)(A)-(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Stephen F. Befort, Pre-employment
Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J 365 (1997). For sarcastic commentary on the limits placed on pre-employment inquiries,
see Peter Huber, Column, Tests Discriminate, FORBES, Aug. 11, 1997, at 128.
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IV. THE LEGALITY OF ExcLusIoN:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND TITLE VII CLAIMS
Public employers surely have valid concerns regarding the employment of
individuals with histories of drug addiction. However, the validity of these
concerns and public sympathy for the position of public employers may not be
enough to counteract the current state of the law. This Part will begin with a brief
discussion of possible constitutional and Title VII claims facing public
employers who disqualify individuals based on a history of drug addiction. An
initial discussion of such claims is important because, although currently not the
most powerful tools to combat this type of employment discrimination, the
Supreme Court has not foreclosed the use of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title
VII in scenarios such as the one presented in this Note.
A. Constitutional Challenges ofEqual Protection and Due Process
An individual who was denied a public safety officer position because of his
or her history of drug addiction may have constitutional claims based upon the
Due Process 73 and Equal Protection74 Clauses of the Constitution. Because no
fundamental rights are implicated and rehabilitated drug users do not constitute a
"suspect class" for constitutional purposes, a low level of scrutiny-the rational
basis test-will be used when the courts review these claims.75 A due process
claim would prevail if the plaintiff had a property or liberty interest in public
employment76 and the denial of employment was not rationally related to
73 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws").
75 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,312-14 (1976).
76 See Desper v. Montgomery County, 727 F. Supp. 959, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("In order
to establish a claim under the fourteenth amendment, plaintiff must show that he has a
cognizable property interest in his employment."). The due process claim would most likely
fail if the applicant could not show a property or liberty interest in acquiring the position. See,
e.g., Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 675-76 (8th Cir. 1980) (An
applicant for a civil service position was found not to have a property interest because there
was no reliance on state statutory entitlement, and he had no liberty interest because he did not
allege any "impairment of his ability to obtain another job.'); Rosario v. City of New Haven,
No. 3-93-CV-419 (WWE), 1998 WL 51786, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 4, 1998) (finding that rank
on an eligibility list was not a "central factor in a communicated policy in hiring... police
officers" and therefore, was not a property interest). For typical explanations of liberty interests
in due process claims, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). For typical
explanations of property interests, see Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
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legitimate governmental interests. An equal protection claim in this context
would prevail if the governmental entity made irrational and over-broad
classifications of individuals because of their history of drug addiction.77
The plaintiffs in Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority78 claimed that
the denial of employment to all individuals who were addicted to drugs violated
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The district court agreed,79
finding that the regulation, which denied employment to all individuals in
rehabilitation, bore no rational relation to the demands of the job to be
performed. It created "irrebuttable presumptions of physical inadequacy." 80
Because of the differences in the individuals involved, the court also noted that
the blanket denial and classification of all individuals who were addicted to
drugs was over-broad and irrational-employment decisions regarding those
with histories of drug addiction must be decided on individual merits.81
The Supreme Court reversed, finding the transit authority's regulation
rationally related to legitimate business interests. 82 The Court stated "the 'no
drugs' policy.., is supported by the legitimate inference that as long as a
treatment program (or other drug use) continues, a degree of uncertainty persists.
Accordingly, an employment policy that postpones eligibility until the treatment
program has been completed... is rational. '83 However, the Court's holding
was tempered by the fact that the Court focused only on those individuals who
were still using controlled substances.
The Supreme Court's opinion is distinguishable from the scenario presented
564,576-78 (1972).
The applicant's ability to show a liberty or property interest sufficient to sustain due
process claims is very unlikely in the scenario presented in this Note. See Davis v. Bucher, 451
F. Supp. 791, 799-801 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding a due process violation when the city of
Philadelphia disqualified applicants on account of their drug histories). But cf. Stana v. School
Dist. of City of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 125-27 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that plaintiff had a
property interest in placement on an eligibility list).
77 See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 307.
78 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This decision was later reversed by the Supreme
Court. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
79 See Beazer, 399 F. Supp. at 1057.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 1051 (noting that the New York City Department of Personnel had a more
acceptable policy in which "a history of drug addiction shall not in itself constitute a bar to
employment'). The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that this result was consistent vith
precedent. See Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1977).
82 See Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979). This is the
Court's only opinion on Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the exclusion of individuals
with drug abuse histories from employment.
83 Id. at 591.
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in this Note. Beazer focused on individuals who were still using drugs and cited
evidence that any continued drug use (even if it were methadone) could effect
job performance. 84 The question of whether or not an individual, who no longer
engages in any use of controlled substances, can be prohibited from civil
employment has not yet been decided by any court.85 Justice Powell
acknowledged this by noting that the Court "has failed to address what it
recognizes as the more difficult issue."86 IHe understood that in regards to
individuals who were completely rehabilitated, the transit authority's blanket
denial of employment was irrational and, thus, violated equal protection and due
process. 87
Although the lowest level of scrutiny would be used for such claims, rational
basis scrutiny is not without teeth.88 In addition, when the prohibition of
individuals who have been addicted to drugs is based on "false presumptions,
generalizations, misconceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears,
and pernicious mythologies,"89 it should be considered irrational per se in light
of the legislative intent of the disability discrimination statutes.90 For example,
when the Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1978 to offer protection for
rehabilitated individuals,91 Congress made clear that presumptions about the
abilities of individuals who have overcome drug addiction was irrational. Senator
Williams, in fact; stated: "[A]n employer cannot assume that a history of
alcoholism or drug addiction.., poses sufficient danger in and of itself to justify
an exclusion. Such an assumption would have no basis in fact."92
Statements such as these provide hope for the future success of a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge. A court may soon hold that an employer's attempt to
discriminate because of one's status as a former addict (rather than his or her
present conduct) is irrationally based on generalizations and stereotypes and,
therefore, prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The foundation has already
84 See id. at 573-77.
85 See, e.g., id. at 572 n.3 (specifying that the Court was not deciding the issue regarding
those who had been completely rehabilitated).
86 Id. at 596 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87 See id. at 596-97 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
942 (1992) (Blackmaun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) ("States can ban abortion if that ban is rationally related to a legitimate State
interest-a standard which the United States calls 'deferential, but not toothless."').
8 9 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 310,311.
9 0 See id.
91 For an excellent discussion of this legislative history, see Henderson, supra note 19, at
728-30.
92 124 CONG. REC. 37,510 (1978) (emphasis added).
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been set.
The status-conduct distinction with regard to drug addiction is not a new
development.93 In 1962, Robinson v. California94 struck down a state statute that
criminalized the status of being a narcotics addict. The Court noted that "[i]t is
unlikely that any State... would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a
person to be... ill .... In this court counsel for the State recognized that
narcotics addiction is an illness. Indeed, it is apparently an illness which may be
contracted innocently or involuntarily." 95 Like a criminal law against addiction,
an employment disqualification based on drug addiction history is a
disqualification based on status--the status of being a former drug addict.
Evidence of present drug use, feigned rehabilitation,96 or present physical or
mental effects of past drug use97 should be required for any disqualification of a
public safety officer applicant. If a case were presented where an individual with
a history of drug addiction was no longer using illegal drugs (or substances like
methadone), courts would have the opportunity to follow the rationale of the
Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit in Beazer-finding a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
93 t should also be noted that the Sixth Circuit in Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62
F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995), applied this status-conduct distinction in the context of the ADA. The
court explained that "a number of cases have considered the issue of misconduct distinct from
the status of the disability" and determined that Congress "clearly contemplate[d]"
distinguishing the two in the ADA. See id. at 847-48. In ADA jurisprudence, courts have
consistently distinguished status and conduct. See, e.g., Landefeld v. Marion General Hosp.,
Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1183 (6th Cir. 1993) (Nelson, J., concurring) ('The plaintiff was clearly
suspended because of his intolerable conduct, and not solely because of his mental
condition."); Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff was not
discharged because he was an addict, but because he possessed heroin for distribution); Neilsen
v. Moroni Feed Comp., 162 F.3d 604, 609 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[U]nsatisfactory conduct caused
by ... illegal drug use does not receive protection under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
However, the mere status of being an... illegal drug user may merit such protection.). In
addition, the Second Circuit recently held that an employee's status as a "recovering drug
addict" was a disability under the ADA. See Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York, 127 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1997).
94 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
95 Id. at 666-67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
96 Such as drug use within the last few months.
97 See, e.g., Neilsen, 162 F.3d at 609 ("[Wjhile an alcoholic or drug addict may not be
denied services or disqualified from employment solely because of his or her condition, the
behavioral manifestations of the condition may be taken into account in determining whether
he or she is qualified."' (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977))).
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B. Title VfI
One typically thinks of statutory challenges against individuals with a drug-
related disability being brought under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA
(discussed in detail below). However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196498
has also been used to challenge discrimination against former drug addicts.
Although the Supreme Court, dealing with a Title VII challenge based on drug
addiction, narrowed the grounds for such a claim, it did not foreclose further
Title VII challenges to the blanket denial of employment.
The theory of a Title VII challenge in this area is based on studies that show
that a disproportionately large number of former drug addicts are minorities as
compared to the number of minorities in the general population.99 A minority
applicant could challenge, based on the disparate impact theory, an employment
qualification that requires a drug-free history. Showing a disparate impact in
such case could establish aprimafacie case under Title VII, placing the burden
on the employer to show that the qualification is related to the applicant's ability
to perform the job for which he or she is applying.100
A Title VII claim was successfully argued to the Southern District Court of
New York in Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority.101 The New York
Transit Authority had a regulation that excluded from employment consideration
all individuals using methadone, a synthetic narcotic given to aid in the
98 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
99 See LEGAL ACTION CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND How TO DEAL WITH IT: A MANUAL FOR PEOPLE
CONCERNED WITH HELPING FORMER DRUG ABUSERS 2 (1977).
100 See, e.g., id.; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
101 414 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y 1976). It is important, however, to note that the original
opinion, reported at 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), did not reach the Title VII issue
because the court found that the blanket exclusion of individuals addicted to heroin, who were
in methadone maintenance rehabilitation programs, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. See Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 399 F.
Supp. 1032, 1058-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The opinion that decided the Title VII issue, reported
at 414 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), was a supplemental opinion issued almost a year later.
The supplemental opinion was in response to the plaintiff's active pursuit of the Title VII claim
in order to collect attorney's fees. See Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 99
(2d Cir. 1977). The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision wvithout reaching the
Title VII issue, noting that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b) (1994), permits a court to allow a prevailing party attorney's fees in § 1983 claims.
See Beazer, 558 F.2d at 99-100. Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of the
district court on the Title VII issue. See Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568,
571 (1979). The Supreme Court's opinion is discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes
110-114.
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rehabilitation of individuals addicted to heroin.102 The four named plaintiffs in
Beazer were minorities who had been "subject to dismissal or rejection as to
employment by the [New York Transit Authority] on the ground of present or
past participation in methadone maintenance programs," for heroin addiction.103
The Beazer plaintiffs included those who were not completely rehabilitated
from drug addiction and were using a synthetic narcotic (methadone) while they
were employed or sought to be employed by the transit authority' 4-
immediately distinguishing this case from the scenario presented in this Note.
Because some plaintiffs were not already rehabilitated, they may not have met
the requirements of bringing an action under the Rehabilitation Act or the
ADA,105 even if those two statutes existed in their present form at the time of
Beazer.106
On the Title VII issue, the district court accepted the disparate impact theory
of the plaintiffs. 107 The plaintiffs showed that "[b]etween 62% and 65% of
methadone maintained persons in New York City are black and
Hispanic .... ,108 The court concluded, "iTWhe policy ... has been shown to
have a substantially greater impact on minority groups than on whites. Since the
policy is not grounded in any business necessity, it violates Title VI."'109
Although the Supreme Court reversed, 110 it clearly limited its holding to
current users of drugs. 111 The Court, noting that "[a] policy excluding allformer
users would be harder to justify than a policy applicable only to persons currently
receiving treatment,"1 12 acknowledged that it was not deciding whether or not
the blanket denial of individuals who have been addicted to drugs would violate
Title VII if applied to those individuals who were completely rehabilitated from
their addiction. 113 The rehabilitated individual could also show that he or she no
102 See Beazer, 399 F. Supp. at 1036.
103 Id. at 1035.
104 See id.
105 See infra Part V.
106 The ADA was not passed until 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act has been amended
significantly since its initial passage.
107 See Beazer, 414 F. Supp. at 279.
108 Id.
10 9 Id. Finding, under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis in the earlier decision, that the
transit authority's regulation was not rationally related to their employment needs, the court
concluded that it was also not grounded in a business necessity for purposes of Title VII. See
id. at 278.
110 See Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568,571 (1979).
111 See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 572 n.3.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 See id. The Court noted that the Rehabilitation Act, which had been recently
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longer uses drugs and should not legitimately be considered a safety hazard.
Justices White and Marshall made an important point in dissent regarding job-
relatedness: They explained that the denial of employment to the plaintiffs could
not be considered job-related without extensive study of the relationship between
an employer's blanket denial policy and job performance ability. 14 Any
qualification requiring a drug-free history should not be considered "job-related"
based merely on the employer's conjecture. Generalities regarding what is
possible should give way to what is probable in light of the applicant's
individual circumstances. If employers can not show that the rehabilitated
applicant poses a safety hazard or direct threat, courts should reject the assertion
that the qualification is job-related.
In sum, the Court has yet to foreclose Title VII challenges to policies that
deny employment to rehabilitated drug addicts. Therefore, minority applicants
for public safety officer positions, who are no longer using drugs, should be
encouraged to bring such challenges.
V. THE LEGALITY OF EXCLUSION UNDER THE DISABILnTY
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
Currently, the most powerful tools to challenge the denial of employment to
individuals who have been rehabilitated from drug addiction are the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990115 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.116
Congress's enactment of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act sent a clear
message-discrimination against individuals with disabilities, especially when
amended, "arguably includes former drug abusers [in its protections]." Id. at 579.
Unfortunately, however, some commentators have ignored the Court's attempt to limit its
holding to current drug users. See Marvin Hill, Jr. & Emily Delacenserie, Procrustean Beds
and Draconian Choices: Lifestyle Regulations and Officious Intermeddlers-Bosse, Workers,
Courts, and Labor Arbitrators, 57 Mo. L. REV. 51, 95 (1992) ("Employees whose lifestyle
resulted in a drug or alcohol problem have little or no recourse under Title VII.").
114 See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 598-602 (White, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Julia
Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria: The Significance of
Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases under Title V, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 1, 24-
25 ("[Tjhe [Beazer] Court may have upheld the Transit Authority's blanket exclusion because
it recognized the Authority's public image as a legitimate, although not job-related, interest of
the employer.... One may certainly question whether an interest in image is a legitimate
reason to sustain a rule that adversely affects blacks and Hispanics.") (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted); Andrew Ayers Martin, Note, Title VII Discrimination in Biochemical
Testing for AIDS and Marijuana, 1988 DUKE L.J 129, 144-45 ("Arguably, the plaintiffs did
not establish a prima facie claim of disparate impact, and the Court did not formally address the
issue of proving the job-relatedness of the policy.").
115 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
116 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (1999).
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based on stereotypes, prejudices, and irrational fears, violates the laws and public
policies of the nation.' 17
One of the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act is "to ensure that the Federal
Government plays a leadership role in promoting the employment of individuals
with disabilities... and in assisting States and providers of services in fulfilling
the aspirations of such individuals with disabilities for meaningful and gainful
employment."118 The Act fulfills its purpose by prohibiting employment
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act,
however, applies only to the federal government and all entities receiving federal
funds 1 19
Much like the Rehabilitation Act, one of the purposes of the ADA is "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.' 120 Congress determined that
in spite of the Rehabilitation Act and improvements in the treatment of disabled
individuals, discrimination "continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social
problem." 12 1 The ADA was enacted to extend the coverage of the Rehabilitation
Act and redress the problems of that Act.122 The ADA extends the prohibition
against disability discrimination to virtually all private and public employers. 123
The ADA specifically applies to all state and local governments, regardless of
whether or not they receive federal funds.124 Therefore, an individual who was
117 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 30, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.N. 303, 311
('Discrimination against people with disabilities also includes adverse actions taken against
individuals with histories of a disability.... Such discrimination often results from false
presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears,
and pemicious mythologies.").
118 29 U.S.C.A. § 701(b)(2).
119 See id. § 794(a).
120 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); see also Tenbrink v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 920 F.
Supp. 1156,1160 (D. Kan. 1996).
121 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
122 See Hutchinson v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 387 (N.D. Iowa
1995).
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (defining "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year').
124 See id. § 12132 (1994) (Title 11 of the ADA) ("Subject to the provisions of this
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."); see also Martin
Schiff, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Its Antecedents, and Its Impact on Law
Enforcement Employment, 58 Mo. L. REV. 869, 873 n.11 (1993) (Quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 35694
(1991), the author notes .'[b]ecause Title 11 of the ADA essentially extends the
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denied employment as a public safety officer by a state or local governmental
entity because of his or her previous drug addiction could bring action under both
statutes.
Any analysis of the legality of disqualifying individuals with drug addiction
histories from public employment must begin with the statutory language of
these anti-discrimination statutes. 125 The general provision against employment
discrimination found in the Rehabilitation Act (and similarly in the ADA126)
states that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 127 State and local governments,
including law enforcement agencies and other civil service agencies, are
explicitly included in this provision because the term "program or activity" is
defined to mean "all the operations of... a department, agency, special purpose
nondiscrimination mandate of [the Rehabilitation Act] to those State and local governments
that do not receive Federal financial assistance, this rule hews closely to the provisions of
existing 504 regulations .... )". See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by
State and Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089 (1995).
125 The importance of looking first to the statute's text when interpreting its meaning has
been advocated by the Supreme Court on many occasions. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1989) (explaining that only when the text of a statute is
ambiguous should one turn to other sources for guidance).
126 The general provision of the ADA applicable to state and local governments states
that "[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability,... be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42
U.S.C. § 12132 (Title II of the ADA); see also Schiff, supra note 124, at 873 n.1 1 (noting
"[b]ecause Title 11 of the ADA essentially extends the nondiscrimination mandate of [the
Rehabilitation Act] to those State and local governments that do not receive Federal financial
assistance, this rule hews closely to the provisions of existing 504 regulations"). See generally
Weber, supra note 124. Because the ADA provision specifies that other sections of the Act
apply to state and local governments as well, one can also look to the general discrimination
provisions of the ADA for clarification. The general discrimination provision of the ADA
states:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (made applicable to all state and local entities by Title H1, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132).
127 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (1999).
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district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government." 128
All individuals with drug addiction histories who apply for public safety
officer positions would have to initially demonstrate that they had a disability,
had a record of a disability, or were regarded as having a disability,129 and were
qualified for the position in question. Because of the common recognition of
drug addiction as a disability and Congressional treatment of addiction as such
(as explained in Part IlI.D above) an individual who was addicted to drugs
should have little difficulty meeting the threshold showing that he or she had a
disability.130 The Second Circuit recently explained that if a person establishes
past addiction, he or she will "automatically be covered under [the statutes] for
having a record of drug addiction" as long as the individual is not currently using
drugs. 13 1 The confusion among employers and applicants typically rests, instead,
in the second initial requirement-showing the applicant is qualified for the job
in question.
In scenarios like those presented in this Note, proving the rehabilitated
applicant's qualification should not be difficult because the applicant was already
placed on the eligibility list for the position. Many state and local governments
place qualified individuals on initial eligibility lists before conducting a
background check,132 the background check being the main vehicle for
employers to inquire about drug addiction history. Placement on an eligibility list
is often considered prima facie evidence that the applicant was qualified.133
12 1Td. § 794(b)(1)(A).
129 See Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
("Establishing that one is disabled is the cornerstone to an ADA plaintiff's prima facie case.").
130 See, e.g., Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 127 F.3d 270, 273 (2d
Cir. 1997) (holding that an individual with a history of drug addiction had a disability for the
purposes of the ADA and that drug addiction "substantially limits one or more... major life
activities'. Note, however, that past drug abuse would be insufficient for an individual to
claim protection under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The individual would have to claim he
or she was addicted in order to be "disabled" for purposes of the statutes. See id. at 273;
Johnson v. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 96 Civ. 1425 (IMBM), 1998 WL 213203, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1998) ('To qualify for this protection [as an individual with a disability], a
person must show that he was actually addicted to alcohol or drugs in the past-as opposed to
having been a casual user of either substance....").
131 See Buckley, 127 F.3d at 273 (emphasis added); Johnson, 1998 WL 213203, at *6
C'In other words, a recovering alcoholic [or drug addict] need not show that one or more of his
major life activities is currently impaired by alcohol [or drug] use in order to be protected from
discrimination... "').
132 See, e.g., Thome v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459,462 (9th Cir. 1983).
133 See, e.g., Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. North Washington Fire Protection Dist.,
772 P.2d 70, 79-80 (Colo. 1989) (noting that disabled firefighter applicants established they
were "otherwise qualified" because they scored well enough on written, oral, and strength and
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Indeed, it would be absurd and contrary to the very concept of an eligibility list if
truly unqualified individuals were ever named "eligible."
More importantly, however, there are specific provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA that deal specifically with the qualifications of
individuals who have been rehabilitated from drug addiction.1 34 Although "an
individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs" is not protected
by the statutes,135 an individual who has been rehabilitated may not be deemed
unqualified because of his or her drug addiction history.1 36 Therefore, employers
agility tests to be placed on eligibility list despite their physical deficiencies); Dalton v. Village
of Palatine, No. 95-C-4154, 1997 WL 189301, *3 (N.D. IIl. Apr. 15, 1997) ("[Sjhe was
qualified for the position as she made the eligibility list.... '); Bouman v. Pitchess, Civ. A.
No. CV 80-1341-RMT (Px), 1985 WL 9428, *5 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("[Slhe was qualified for the
promotion by virtue of her ranking on the eligibility list"); Herron v. City of Chicago, 619 F.
Supp. 767, 771 (N.D. 111. 1985) ("[Plaintiffs] were rated qualified and placed on the eligibility
list...."); Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816, 818 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[A]ppointments... must be
made from an eligibility list containing the names of all qualified applicants .... "); Bolden v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 73 F.R.D. 370, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ('The defendant Pennsylvania
State Police shall establish an eligibility list of qualified applicants for hiring for each State
Police Academy class .... " ); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1104 (E.D. Pa.
1972) ("[1]ndividuals on existing eligibility lists are properly qualified for appointment or
promotion as the case may be."); United States v. City of St Louis, No. 74-200 C (3), 1977
WL 27, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 21, 1977) ("All black applicants who were placed upon the
eligibility list for Fire Captain ... shall be deemed qualified ... ."); Leen v. Carr, 945 F. Supp.
1151, 1153 (N.D. fI1. 1996) ("If an applicantis deemed 'qualified,' his orher name is placed on
an eligibility list").
134 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (1999) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability... be subjected to
discrimination ..... ) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) ("No qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,.., be subjected to discrimination... .);
see also Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that under the
Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiffmust show she or he is qualified for the position).
135 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20XC(i) (1999) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1994).
136 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(C)(ii). The provision of the ADA states:
Nothing in ... this section shall be construed to exclude as a qualified individual with a
disability an individual who-() has successfully completed a supervised drug
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has
otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use; (2) is
participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use;
or (3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use.
42 U.S.C. § 12114(b).
Note that from the above language an employer does not have to provide the applicant
with an opportunity for rehabilitation; "[a]ddicts already must be rehabilitated or in
rehabilitation at the time their employers take adverse action against them:' Henderson, supra
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could only deny employment to an individual if they could show that the
applicant was currently using illegal drugs.137
Looking at the language protective of rehabilitated drug users in the context
of the whole statute also shows Congress's intent not to allow any employer to
use history of drug addiction to disqualify an applicant.138 Although
understanding employers' concerns with hiring individuals with drug
histories, 139 Congress drew a clear line between the lawful consideration of drug
use and the unlawful discrimination against those with drug-related disabilities.
Congress explicitly provided authority to employers to discipline drug users. 140
The employer, for example, can prohibit the use of drug and alcohol in the
workplace and provide drug testing of employees to ensure compliance with the
laws regulating drug abuse.141 One could therefore assume that, because
Congress provided specific authority for employers to deny employment to
current drug users, included a section that explicitly protected rehabilitated drug
addicts, and nowhere made exceptions for state and local public safety officer
positions, Congress intended to protect rehabilitated individuals who apply for
public safety officer positions.
Even those critical of the effects that this protection may have on law
enforcement agencies agree that the statutes plainly prohibit all employers from
discriminating on the basis of drug addiction history when the applicant is not
currently using drugs. For example, one commentator explained:
note 19, at 733 n.160 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 41-42 (1989)). Note also that, under
§ 12114(b)(3), the individual who has been rehabilitated from drug addiction would not be
excluded from protection if the employer erroneously believed him or her to be currently
engaging in drug use.
137 The applicant would be considered "currently engaging in" the use of drugs if "they
have used drugs recently enough to support a reasonable belief that their drug use is 'current.'
Henderson, supra note 19, at 733 n.157 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-558, at 60 (1990)).
Congress made its intent clear that this "currently engaging in" standard was not to exclude
those who have histories of drug use but are no longer engaged in this activity. See H.R. REP.
No. 101-485(11), at 77 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 360. To ensure that the
applicant is no longer using drugs, employers can perform drug testing on applicants. See, eg.,
42 U.S.C. § 12114(b). For a detailed discussion of pre-employment drug testing, see L.
CAMILLE HtBERT, EMPLOYEEPRIVACY LAW § 3.09 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
13 8 The Court has often said that one way to interpret the intent of a statute is to read the
applicable section in the context of other sections. See, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S.
642, 650 (1974) ("When interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular
clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole
statute....").
139 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c)-(e).




Perhaps the foremost problem for law enforcement under the ADA is that
even though a drug addict need not be employed, a drug abuser who deems
himself rehabilitated would have to first be hired conditionally as a police
officer, and then the police department would have the burden of establishing
that he was still abusing drugs in order to show that he was not qualified.142
Although this statement was made to illustrate the opinion that the protection
offered by the statutes is detrimental to public employers, the commentator's
interpretation of the ADA (which would also apply to the Rehabilitation Act)
must be correct when one considers the language of the statute.143
142 Schiff, supra note 124, at 900; see also Sally Gross-Farina, Comment, Fit for Duty?
Cops, Choirpractice, and Another Chance for Healing, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1079, 1118
(1993) ("A literal reading demands the conclusion that an employer cannot discriminate against
a cocaine addict who is rehabilitated.., as long as that person is not currently using drugs.")
(emphasis in original); Thomas P. Murphy, Disabilities Discrimination Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 36 CATHOLIC LAw. 13, 22 (1995) (noting that a parochial school could
not discriminate against an individual who has a history of drug addiction when that person
applies for a teaching position); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans With Disabilities Act
Interpreting The Title IRegulations: The Hard Cases, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 18-19
(1992) ("A more troubling scenario is a... policy that simply prohibits former drug abusers
from serving as police officers .... Since former drug addiction is a protected status under the
ADA, the [employer] may have violated the ADA by discriminating solely on that status.").
143 It is also interesting to realize, although this Note does not cover applicants forfederal
law enforcement positions, that the FBI has recently changed its policy regarding individuals
with histories of drug abuse. On March 7, 1994, the director of the FBI announced that
applicants with histories of drug abuse would no longer be automatically excluded from
consideration for FBI employment. See FBI to Give Polygraph Tests for Drug Use to Agency
Job Applicants, Director Freeh Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Mar. 10, 1994, at 46 dl0
[hereinafter Polygraph Tests]. The FBI, however, insisted that this new policy does not
condone prior unlawful drug use and is even more stringent than the former policy of blanket
exclusion for all previous drug users (except those who experimented with marijuana) because
it now requires applicants to undergo polygraph testing about such use. See id. The stated
purpose of the new policy is "to set forth guidelines for determining whether an applicant's
prior use makes him/her unsuitable for employment, balancing the needs of the FBI to maintain
a drug-free workplace and the public integrity necessary to accomplish its law enforcement
mission with the desirability of affording the opportunity of employment to the broadest
segment of society .... Id.; cf In re Petition and Questionnaire for Admission to Rhode Island
Bar, 683 A.2d 1333, 1367 (R.I. 1996) (finding that inquiries about drug histories on bar
applications violates the law); Lanny King, Note, The Kentucky Board of Bar Examiners'
Character and Fitness Certification Questionnaire: Are Mental Health Inquiries a Violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 84 KY. L.J. 685, 697-704 (1996) (discussing a state by




VI. HE ESSENTIAL FUNCTION DEBATE
The determination that an individual with a drug addiction history is disabled
for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and that an applicant cannot be
disqualified for a position based on this history does not end the analysis. An
employer could lawfully disqualify an individual with a history of drug addiction
if it were shown that the individual could not perform the essential function of
the position (or that the employer's reliance on the individual's disability was
consistent with a business necessity). State and local entities often attempt to
disqualify an applicant with a history of drug addiction by arguing that she or he
cannot perform one of the essential functions of the job.
The regulations specify that the determination of the position's essential
functions can be made after considering, among other things, the belief of the
employer as to what functions are essential, the written job description prepared
before interviewing the applicant, and the amount of time the employee will
spend performing the function.144 For example, one commentator has stated that
the essential functions of a police officer position "are grounded in the traits
expected of a police officer: good character, as manifested, in part, by the
absence of a record of criminal arrests and drug use .... ",145
Although employers play a major role in the determination of what functions
are essential, the Supreme Court has stated that such employer determinations of
essential functions should not be too readily assumed to be valid: "It is possible
to envision situations where an insistence on continuing past requirements and
practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of
the opportunity to participate in a covered program." 146 As discussed below,
notwithstanding the statute's deference to employer's determinations of a job's
"essential functions," it is difficult to imagine a legally sufficient justification for
the blanket denial of public safety officer employment due to the applicant's
drug addiction history.
A. Justificationsfor Drug History Qualifications
Public employers most often justify their policies of excluding individuals
with drug addiction histories based on the notion that morality is an essential
function or business necessity for public safety officer positions. And as
mentioned in Part 1I.C, most laws and regulations on the subject of drug
addiction history are linked to the concept of moral character. Indeed, it is no
144 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1998).
145 Schiff, supra note 124, at 902.
146 Southeastem Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,412 (1979).
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surprise that good moral character is a desirable trait for public safety officers;147
good character and trustworthiness are important to any employer in the public
or private sector. What an individual has done in his or her past, especially when
it is something as taboo as drug addiction, 148 is often seen, rightly or wrongly, to
be conclusive of what he or she will do in the future. Consider this opinion from
an expert on police officer selection standards made in 1955:
An Established reputation for good moral character is, without a doubt the most
important element in the preliminary qualification of the police officer. In
addition to the temptations and corrupting influences surrounding the
performance of the police duty, which are of a nature to test the moral fiber of
any man, the police officer is required to enforce laws and ordinances
establishing a certain standard of personal and social conduct If he or she is to
be a reliable public agent, then he or she must be in general accord with the
policies which such laws represent Perhaps the best indication of this is the
applicant's own past record in the community and his attitude toward society. 149
147 One former officer noted that "[m]orality... is inextricably a facet of law
enforcement and a police officer's character is the key to his or her success." RICKEY D.
LASHLEY, POLICVORK: THE NEED FORA NOBLE CHARACER 4 (1995).
148 For an interesting explanation of drug addiction as societal taboo, see Jacob Sullum,
Voodoo Social Policy: Exorcising the Twin Demons, Guns and Drugs, REASON, Oct. 1994, at
26. Sullum notes:
[Tjhe history of drug prohibition is filled with warnings that reflect a fear of losing
control, of being taken over by an outside force. If you smoke marijuana, you will chop
up your family. If you take LSD, you will jump out a window. If you inject heroin, you
will burglarize homes. If you smoke crack, you will have sex with animals.
Id. at 31. Sullum also suggests why this societal taboo persists: "[R]espectable, productive
people are understandably reluctant to stand up and say, 'I use illegal drugs, and I'm a pillar of
the community.... In some ways it is safer to acknowledge one's homosexuality than to reveal
a history of illegal drug use."' Jacob Sullum, Drugs and Deviance, Speech at the Libertarian
Convention in Columbus, Ohio (May 1995) (transcript available at <http'//
www.reason.comfspeeches/LP.html>) [hereinafter Sullum, Drugs and Deviance]. If Sullum's
sense is correct, it is rather ironic considering that individuals who have overcome drug
addiction are protected by federal discrimination statutes, whereas gays and lesbians are not.
14 9 JAMES A. CONSER & ROGER D. THOMPSON, POLICE SELECTION STANDARDS AND
PROCESSES IN OHIO: AN ASSESSMENT 161 (1976) (quoting Thomas M. Frost, Selection
Methods for Police Recruits, 46 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 135-45 (1955));
see also Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d 430,431
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (Noting the importance of public perception of police officers,
the court in this drug testing case quoted the words of the local police director: "Police Officers
should bear in mind that they symbolize the dignity and authority of the Law. It is a harsh
reality that we, as Police Officers, must maintain standards of conduct that are above that which
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This opinion has been, without a doubt adopted by many state and local
governments. For example, the preface to the Columbus, Ohio civil service
regulations for police officers and firefighters illustrates the implementation of
this widely held belief:
The purpose of the background investigation is to determine whether an
applicant... has demonstrated respect for the law and the rights of
others .... The public demands a high level of integrity with respect to
firefighters and law enforcement officers. It is important to keep in mind that
Columbus police officers and firefighter applicants are held to a higher standard
than other applicants.150
Some public safety officer employers may also support the exclusion of
individuals who have been addicted to drugs because of the effect on co-worker
morale that may result when it is discovered that the agency has employed a
former drug addict.151 The resulting morale problems could be the result of
either prejudice, fears, or stereotypes regarding the rehabilitated individual or the
perception that the individual is receiving special treatment. 152 The EEOC has
been very reluctant to allow such justifications for any employer policy that
would result in the discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 153
Other justifications appear to be much more job related and, therefore, much
more persuasive. One such justification is related to public safety.154 Public
employers may argue that the risks posed by an individual with a history of drug
addiction in the position of public safety officer are severe when one considers
the frequency of relapse. 155 It has also been noted that there would be credibility
is expected of the average citizen in order that we maintain the confidence and trust of the
public that we serve."); Michael J. Sipes, Letter to the Editor, On-Job Temptations Too Great
to Let Ex-Users on Police Force, DATON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 12, 1997, at 12A.
150 COLUMBUs CIVIL SERVICE COMMIssION, supra note 48 (emphasis in original).
151 See Lisa E. Key, Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality, and the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1003 (1997).
152 See id. at 1009.
153 See id. at 1032-33 (quoting the EEOC's technical assistance manual as stating: "an
employer may not claim undue hardship solely because providing an accomniodation has a
negative impact on the morale of other employees").
154 An example of the public safety rationale offered by state and local entities can be
found in Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.L 1986). In this case, however,
the court rejected the argument by explaining: "The threat posed by the widespread use of
drugs is real and the need to combat it manifest. But it is important not to permit fear and panic
to overcome our fundamental principles and protections'" Id. at 1522. This concept may be tied
to the "Direct Threat' defense in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(r) (1998).
155 For a discussion about the factors contributing to the high incidence of relapse, see
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and impeachment problems when rehabilitated police officers were called upon
to testify in criminal proceedings.1 56 Along the same lines, public employers
may argue that hiring individuals with drug addiction histories would
compromise the public confidence in the entity's image and integrity. 157
Although many courts would probably be sympathetic to these proposals, other
courts have questioned whether or not this is sufficiently related to the
performance of the job to justify the discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. For example, one court has stated: "Clearly, no one can deny that the
public has a interest in the integrity of its fire fighting forces. Yet, the ability of
fire fighters to perform their jobs is not dependent upon the public's 'perception'
of this integrity .... In other words, fire fighters can still continue to serve the
public effectively, even in the face of unpopular public 'perception."" 158
State and local employers may also argue, especially with regard to positions
in law enforcement, that an essential function of a police officer is a role model
for the community. Some believe this function cannot be performed if the
individual has a history of drug addiction. Related to this claim is the assertion
that an essential function of a public safety officer position is a respect for the
law and that the applicant's past addiction to illegal drugs demonstrates a
disrespect for the law. However, this role model "function" may not be damaged
by a person who has overcome a difficult disease such as drug addiction. Such an
individual could be a powerful voice of the dangers of drug use and addiction as
well as the availability and success of drug rehabilitation programs.
PErERS, supra note 18, at 74-82.
15 6 See Carl T. Rowan, Jr., D.C. Confidential: The Lawless Lawmen of Our Nation's
Capital, THENEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 19, 1998, at 20 ("[Tjhe local equivalent of the [D.C. District
Attorney's Office] maintains a list of more than 300 cops whose backgrounds are so
tainted.., that they cannot testify in court because defense attorneys would easily impeach
their testimony."). Keith Alan Byers also writes:
[A] law enforcement agency could argue that a past record of drug addiction should be
disqualifying because of any of the following reasons: The individual's previous record of
repeated illegal behavior directly conflicts with the very nature of law enforcement;
various risks and temptations could result from permitting the individual to investigate
drug offenses; and the credibility and impeachment problems that would arise whenever
the individual might testify in criminal proceedings.
Keith Alan Byers, No One is Above the Law When it Comes to the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act-Not Even Federal, State, or Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 30 LOY. LA. L. REV. 977,
1018 (1997).
157 See, e.g., Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Capua v. City
of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Grimes v. United States Postal Service, 872 F.
Supp. 668 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
158 Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1521.
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Whether expressed as respect for the law, absence of moral turpitude, or an
attempt to strengthen the public's confidence in the authorities, government
justifications for drug history qualifications boil down to an attempt to preserve
what is seen as a proxy for moral character and a predictor of the applicant's
future job performance. The use of drug addiction history in this way, however,
is not based on the individualized determination that the law requires; 159 it is
stereotyping,160 which would not be permitted (and rightly so) in regard to other
characteristics. Furthermore, public employers' use of drug addiction histories
does not take into account their ability to take other measures-such as drug
testing-to ensure that the individual is not currently using drugs.161
B. Who Will Prevail?
Based on the prevalence of the regulations disqualifying former drug addicts
and the lack of cases that have challenged these regulations, it would appear that
many are confident that public employers would prevail if challenged about such
practices. Indeed, the EEOC regulations state: "An employer, such as a law
enforcement agency, may also be able to impose a qualification standard that
excludes individuals with a history of illegal use of drugs if it can show that the
standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity."'162 Importantly,
however, the EEOC also recognizes that employers may not use the "business
necessity" defense if an applicant with a drug addiction history has an "extensive
period of successful performance."'163
The EEOC regulation that seems to permit the use of drug addiction history
qualifications, however, may not be supported by the statutes. The legislative
history of the ADA, for example, explains: "Decisions are not permitted to be
based on generalizations about the disability but rather must be based on the facts
of an individual case."' 164 A qualification standard based on history of illegal
159 "Decisions are not permitted to be based on generalizations about the disability but
rather must be based on the facts of an individual case.' H.R. REP. No. 101- 485, (111), at 45
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.445, 468.
160 See, e.g., Sullum, Drugs and Deviance, supra note 148 ('The stereotypes do not deal
with averages or probabilities. They make sweeping generalizations: if you use illegal drugs,
you must be a hippie, a criminal, an outcast, a leech.").
161 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12114(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(c) (1998).
162 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.3 (1998) (emphasis added). The regulation only mentions law
enforcement agencies, but municipalities have often extended this qualification to firefighters
and other public safety officers. See supra Part m.c.
163 Tucker, supra note 142, at 19-20 (citing TECHNICAL AsSISTANCE MANUAL, supra
note 18, at § 8.7).
164 H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 45 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 468.
[Vol. 60:711
DRUG ADDICTION HISTORY
drug use, like the one approved by the EEOC for police officers, nullifies this
individualized determination and undermines the purposes of the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act.165
Contradictory statements on this topic do not end with the regulations and
legislative history. Although the Supreme Court has never dealt with this issue,
the few lower courts that have come close to this topic have been inconsistent.166
Recognizing this inconsistency, one commentator noted:
There is very little precedent concerning protections for persons who
erroneously are regarded as drug abusers or who are recovering drug abusers.
Although courts may find precedent helpful when considering cases involving
alcoholism, there is little guidance for courts when prior or perceived drug abuse
is involved. Furthermore, the regulations and legislative history provide virtually
no guidance on either of these issues. For these reasons, the EEOC and the
courts will be required to create their own standards for determining the scope of
protection under the ADA for persons with alcoholism or persons who have, or
who are regarded as having, abused drugs.167
After looking at some of the courts' opinions, one thing is certain-no one could
currently sum up a definitive stance or predict future holdings. 168
Some courts have shown their reluctance to allow the disqualification of an
individual because of a history of drug use. For example, in Johnson v. Smith, 169
the court would not defer to the defendant's assertions that a drug-free history
was necessary for a corrections officer.170 Similarly, in Nisperos v. Buck,171 the
165 See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 142, at 9 (noting that some EEOC regulations should be
invalid from a policy perspective and explaining that the "basic premise of the ADA is to
eliminate 'overprotective rules and policies' that have the effect of discriminating against
persons with disabilities.") (citation omitted).
166 This inconsistency is magnified by the facts of the individual cases, which often
present issues of the applicant's recent conduct or drug use. See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia
Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139 (1988).
167 Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201,
249 (1993).
168 Many have tried to predict how the courts would treat this issue. For example, one
commentator writes that "[i]n most cases it seems very unlikely that a court would disagree
with the refusal of a law enforcement agency to employ or accommodate a rehabilitated drug
addict." Byers, supra note 156, at 1018 (acknowledging, however, that the EEOC apparently
disagrees with such an assertion). As this Note demonstrates, however, it is easy to arrive at the
opposite conclusion.
169 1985 WL 4998, Civ. No. 5-84-131 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 1985).
170 See id. at *2. Such assertions were that the applicant's drug abuse history showed
"weak character ... inability to differentiate right and wrong, and susceptibility to
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that the plaintiff's drug use
disqualified him from consideration for a job as a Department of Justice attorney
working for the INS. 172 The INS argued that because its work often involves
drug-related issues, employment of an attorney who had previously been arrested
for illegal drug use would undermine the agency's integrity.173 The court,
however, rejected the argument and explained: "[W]hile in the best of all worlds
attorneys should not be involved with drugs, defendant must do more than recite
broad generalizations to demonstrate that a drug-free history is an 'essential'
element of a general attorney's job."174 According to the court, an employer's
interest in a drug-free workplace could only justify termination of an employee
currently using drugs, but not one with only a history of past drug use.175
Consistently, other courts have also noted that public employers have less
intrusive means of ensuring department integrity by maintaining a drug-free
workplace-such as drug testing and workplace supervision.176
Other examples in accord with these propositions can be found. For
example, in Wallace v. Veterans Administration,177 an applicant for a nursing
position in the intensive care unit of a local hospital was denied employment
because of her drug abuse history. 178 The hospital argued that dispensing of
narcotics was an essential function of the nurse position, and, because of
plaintiffs history of drug abuse and inability to dispense narcotics, she was not
qualified for the position. 179 Noting the language and purpose of the
Rehabilitation Act and the employer's burden of proving that the reliance on
plaintiffs disability was job-related, the court found that a drug-free history was
not required for her to perform the job. Such a qualification violated the
manipulation." Id. at *1.
171 720 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (aff'd without opinion sub nom. Nisperos v.
McNary, 936 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991)).
172 See id. at 1428.
173 See id. at 1428-29.
174 Id. at 1429.
175 See id.; see also Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438 (ND.
Cal. 1995) (noting that in the context of a private insurer's termination of participating
physician agreement because of physician's history of drug abuse, "[t]his type of differential
treatment based upon past addiction, without regard to whether there is any current effect on
the previously addicted person's ability to practice his profession competently, has been held to
violate the Rehabilitation Act's prohibition of discrimination based on disability") (citations
omitted).
17 6 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 924 F. Supp. 225,250 (D.D.C. 1996).
177 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kans. 1988).
178 See id. at 760.




If a history of drug addiction for a corrections officer, an INS attorney, or an
intensive care nurse does not justify discrimination, it is hard to imagine that a
drug-free history qualification would be found to be an essential function (or
business necessity) of any position-including public safety officer. But other
courts have given glimpses of their willingness to uphold public employers'
insistence on drug-free histories as a qualification for public safety officer
employment. The courts have often been sympathetic to a public employer's
image and its ability to preserve the public trust.181 One court has even noted that
"moral qualifications" are not necessarily beyond the scope of the Rehabilitation
Act.182 Although the facts of that case dealt with a police officer engaging in
drug use while employed, the court's statement could have significant negative
impact on rehabilitated individuals; many state and local regulations regarding
drug abuse history qualifications are, as noted above, purportedly based on
morality.
Another troubling example comes from the same court that was once
sympathetic to rehabilitated individuals.183 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
stated, in Desper v. Montgomery County,184 that "a [drug] rehabilitation program
could not alter the fact that an officer violates the laws he or she is sworn to
uphold."'185 The court found that the plaintiff, although completing a
rehabilitation program, was not "otherwise qualified" as required by the
Rehabilitation Act.186 Also, in Hartman v. City of Petaluma,187 the court found
that a history of past drug use may be used to disqualify an applicant for a city
180 Seeid. at 767.
181 See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988); Heron
v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986); City of Minneapolis v. Moe, 450 N.W.2d 367 (Minn.
App. Ct. 1990); Tharpe v. City of Newark Police Dep't, 619 A.2d 228, 230 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992); Faure v. Chesworth, 489 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Desper v.
Montgomery County, 727 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
182 See Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1148.
183 See Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding that a blanket refusal
to consider individuals with histories of drug addiction for municipal employment violated due
process and equal protection).
184 727 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
185 Id. at 963. The Court cites Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department, 840 F.2d
1139, 1149 (3d Cir. 1988), as support for this statement without mention that the plaintiff in
Copeland was a current user of illegal drugs. The distinction between current users and
rehabilitated users is an important one that should never be overlooked by courts in light of the
language of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
186 See Desper, 727 F. Supp. at 963.
187 841 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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police officer position.' 88 Although disqualifying the applicant, the city did not
state it was doing so because of his drug history but because of his "lack of
candor regarding that drug use"1 89 (as well as his dishonesty about drug abuse on
his employment application.) 190 These facts of the applicant's misconduct make
this case distinguishable from the scenario presented in this Note and illustrate
the conduct-versus-status distinction that was explained above.
A look at the principles developed from drug testing cases can also prove
useful in this area. In a prominent drug testing case, the Supreme Court declared
that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring that certain employees
have "unimpeachable integrity and judgment."'' 91 In another case, the Supreme
Court has noted that the government has a compelling interest to allow
employers to exclude employees who "under compulsion of circumstances or for
other reasons,... might compromise sensitive information."192 These two
statements may, in the future, also justify the exclusion of applicants with drug
abuse histories because, as one court noted, those individuals may be vulnerable
to "substantial financial pressures, heightened susceptibility to coercion or undue
influence, or general unreliability,"'193 making them a threat to the employer's
interests.
All of these cases would be relied on by both parties in a dispute about the
legality of using an applicant's drug history as an employment qualification. The
range of holdings and factual situations makes it difficult to predict what a court
would do if such a scenario were presented to it. Certainly, however, the
employer seeking to exclude an individual because of his or her drug abuse
history must, if challenged, articulate essential functions for the position that are
consistent with the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. The
employer also has the burden of demonstrating business necessity if that
affirmative defense is available. These burdens in themselves and the unsettled
nature of this area of law make legal challenges to such employer practices
worthwhile. 194
188 See id. at 950.
189 Id. at 947.
190 See id. at 949.
191 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989)
(upholding U.S. Customs Service's drug testing policy for front line drug interdiction
personnel because of the threats of having current drug abusers in these positions).
192 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).
193 American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
924 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting that an employee's integrity may be a "valid
governmental interest," but found it not controlling in the context of a housing agency).
194 Placing these burdens on employers in this context is exactly what Congress intended
the disability discrimination statutes to accomplish. See 29 U.S.C. § 720(a)(3)(A) (1999)
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VII. A RECOMMENDATION FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYERS
In order to safeguard against liability from many possible legal challenges,
state and local entities should cease using drug addiction history as a per se
disqualification for public safety officer positions. Even if one thinks that such a
qualification should be permitted as a predictor of an applicant's future job
performance, the current state of the law, especially under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act provides a substantial risk of liability. In addition, it will be
difficult for states and municipalities to argue that a requirement of "no past drug
addiction" is an essential qualification when other public employers do not think
so. There are many employers who do not have a blanket denial policy for
applicants with drug addiction histories. For example, Captain Donald Mates,
director of the Montgomery County (Maryland) police personnel said, "We
would love to have a zero-past-drug-use policy. Unfortunately, you have to
accept some things in people's backgrounds."'195 In fact some even suggest that
it is essential for public employers to accept applicants who have been
rehabilitated from drug addiction. Police departments, which have pressure to
"put more cops on the streets," 196 must compete for well-qualified individuals
who want to be public safety officers. 197 If the applicant has been rehabilitated
and is otherwise a well-qualified individual, the community is actually worse off
if the applicant is not hired. Furthermore, it is important to note that the FBI has
recently changed its policy on drug addiction history.198 In 1994, the director of
the FBI announced that the Bureau would no longer automatically exclude
individuals with histories of drug abuse from consideration for employment 199 -
a clear indicator that the days of blanket exclusions of rehabilitated drug addicts
are numbered.
Other public employers should follow the FBI's example. The bell has tolled
for the no-drug-history policies justified by the "essential function" and
("Individuals with disabilities... are generally presumed to be capable of engaging in gainful
employment."); see also Tehan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 515 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("An employer obviously may not assume that because a person has a handicap, he
or she is unable to function in a given work context.").
195 Wagner, supra note 13.
196 See, e.g., Vanessa Ho, Police Shortage Delays Responses: Cities Around State
Struggle With Numbers, TBE SEATrLE POST-IN= GENCER, Mar. 6, 1998, at Cl; Peter
Hermann, City Police Struggling with Shortage, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 5, 1998, at lB.
197 See Hermann, supra note 196, at lB ("Official who changed the policy [with respect
to police applicants' drug abuse histories] said they needed to relax standards to compete for
quality recruits.').
198 See Polygraph Tests, supra note 143, at 46 d10.
199 See id.
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"business necessity" defenses. Instead of automatic exclusions from public
safety officer positions, clearly lawful means-such as drug testing200-exist to
assure that applicants will not pose a safety risk to the public nor undermine the
credibility of their office. 201 The statutory provisions in the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA that enable employers to maintain a drug free workplace provide
more than enough protection for any concerns in this area.
What about public employers who choose not to heed this warning and feel
that the no-drug-history policy is worth the liability risks? Similar "essential
function" disqualifications should then be made for individuals with histories of
adultery, compulsive gambling, domestic abuse, and other immoral (and perhaps
illegal) acts. This, after all, would be the only way to "purify" the ranks and
make credibility impeachment nearly impossible. With such purification,
however, one wonders if there would be any "qualified" applicants left. If,
however, the rationale for drug history policies is "respect for the law" and
maintaining higher moral standards for law enforcement personnel, why do
public employers stop at drug addiction history? There must be something more
invidious behind no-drug-history policies. Absent equality of treatment among
moral offenders, a strong case of disability discrimination could be made against
public employers who establish these tenuous qualifications.
Finally, to the chagrin of many, it just may be that American society is
beyond the "respect for the law" and "higher moral standard" rationale. The
recent presidential impeachment events have shown as much. Although
condemned by the House of Representatives, the American people ranked
President Clinton the most respected man of 1998--outranking Pope John Paul
]I.2 02 This does not mean that Americans respect those who apparently lie under
200 In addition to statutory authority to establish drug testing programs, the Supreme
Court has held that such testing of public employees is constitutional. See National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). But cf Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct.
1295 (1997) (illustrating the constitutional limits on drug testing).
Another example of lawful means to achieve the goals of public employers can be found
in the FBI's new policy in this area. The FBI policy, while prohibiting blanket exclusions of
individuals with drug abuse history, has instituted polygraph test questions about the nature
and extent of prior drug use in an attempt to understand "whether an applicant's prior use
makes her/him unsuitable for employment, balancing the needs of the FBI to maintain a drug-
free workplace... [with the] desirability of affording the opportunity of employment to the
broadest segment of society." Polygraph Tests, supra note 143, at 46 dlO.
201 Cf TEcHNICAL ASSIsTANCE MANUAL, supra note 18, at § 8.7 (stating that periodic
drug testing of a rehabilitated drug addict might satisfy the reasonable accommodation
provision).
202 A recent article reports:
Eighteen percent of those surveyed named the President as the living person they
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oath. It does show, however, that society is more willing to look beyond the sin
and make individual determinations about the sinner. Perhaps now we can
separate one's ability to do a good job as a public servant from mistakes
previously made in his or her private life.203 The policies of public employers
should do the same with regard to individuals with drug addiction histories.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law as it currently stands raises serious doubts about a state or local
entity's ability to disqualify public safety officer applicants based solely on their
history of drug addiction. Individual determinations must replace generalities and
stereotypes. The language and spirit of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
establish a presumption that many public employers are breaking the law. Unless
these employers stop relying on no-drug-history policies, it is only a matter of
time before legal challenges are brought. The strength of arguments that
rehabilitated individuals can make, the evolving understanding of drug addiction
as a disease, and emerging societal attitudes that undermine the dominant
rationale for such policies make it likely that some challenges will succeed.
Liability and its accompanying stigma will soon be imposed on institutions
whose purpose should be enforcement of the laws and whose limited resources
can undoubtedly be better spent.
most looked up to, up 4 points from last year despite his bald-faced lie to the country, a
wishy-washy apology and 12 months of sordid headlines about Monica Lewinsky, a
stained dress and a cigar. Pope John Paul, No. 2 on the list, was picked by 7%.
Helen Kennedy, Clinton Fills the Bill: Prez Outpoints the Pope as Most Admired in US., NEW
YORK DAILY NEWs, Jan. 1, 1999, at 3 (also noting that the President's approval rating is at "a
career high 73%... as the Senate readies to put him on trial'); see also Associated Press,
Clintons Are Most Admired Man, Woman in Annual Poll, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1999, at
A2.
203 Compare the recent induction of Lawrence Taylor into the Pro Football Hall of Fame.
Taylor was inducted in spite of the fact that he "was suspended once and arrested twice on drug
charges, was found guilty of filing false income tax returns and was questioned by a grand jury
investigating organized crime." ESPN.com, Hall Opens Doors for Taylor (Feb. 2, 1999)
<httpv/www.espn.go.com/nfl.news/1999/990130/01075745.html>. Although there was some
debate about Taylor's moral fitness, it was determined that .'[t]he Hall is about performance on
the field' and that .'[the public understands that by making ajudgment on what he did on the
field, you're not judging what he did off it."' Id. (statements of NFL commissioner Paul
Tagliabue). In fact, a motion was proposed for a "character clause," which would make a
player's character a relevant issue in the selection process, but was "voted down 24-11." Tom
Weir, Taylor Relieved that His FieldFeats Matter Most, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 1999, at 15C.
19991

